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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD 0. BJORK, HERMAN A. 
BJORK, BEATRICE A. WILCOX 
and ARTHUR ANDERSON, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs, 
APRIL INDUSTRIES, INC., a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
CASE NO. 
14143 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
HAROLD 0. BJORK, HERMAN A. BJORK, 
BEATRICE A. WILCOX and ARTHUR ANDERSON 
There are two obvious omissions in April's analysis 
of the case in its brief. First, it utterly disregards 
the problem its inconsistent positions created, asserting, 
on one hand, that the shares and the registration agree-
ment are void, and on the other, contending plaintiffs 
should have sold. April does not explain how it or the 
-1-
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trial court could logically have required plaintiffs to 
sell or attempt to sell restricted shares that April said 
were invalid. Such a position requires plaintiffs to per-
form either useless or impossible acts. Second, April 
has shown no evidence of any intentional relinquishment 
of registration rights. 
When April failed to register the shares, the breach 
of contract occurred and damage accrued. Damage would not 
have been avoided nor minimized by more contact by plain-
tiffs with April than in fact occurred, because April would 
not have recognized the restricted shares, nor permitted 
the transfer thereof. 
We shall analyze April's brief in detail, giving refer-
ence to the page numbers of its brief wherein the point is 
asserted. 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS DESIRED TO SELL 
The SEC gives a peculiar connotation to the term 
"registration." Instead of involving the type of things 
which unsophisticated persons might expect, such as filing 
the stock certificate in a registrar's office, getting a 
designated registration number, etc., the SEC deems stock 
-2-
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to be "registered" if there is a "prospectus" describing 
it. Such SEC parlance is hardly that with which laymen 
might be expected to be conversant. April states that 
those plaintiffs who received the preliminary and final 
prospectus (excluding Arthur Anderson, who didn't receive 
them) clearly understood them (p.4). There is no evidence 
nor finding to that effect. There was a finding that 
they were aware or should have been aware of the agreement, 
but none that they understood the prospectus. The evi-
dence is to the contrary, showing lack of understanding 
(R.226,227,357,358,364). 
April argues that the court found that plaintiffs 
did not really want to include their shares in the public 
offering (p.5). The finding of the court related to their 
desires to sell, rather than their desires to have their 
shares included in the public offering. Not only was 
there evidence that each subjectively had the desire to 
sell, there also was objective evidence of many attempts 
by various plaintiffs to get freely tradeable shares 
and to sell, such as contacting the SEC, various brokers, 
April's president, and April's attorney. The quoted 
portions of some of the plaintiffs' testimony (p.9-11) 
simply show that the plaintiffs made no demand for dam-
See plaintiffs' original brief pages 8 - 13. 
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ages between the time of the breach of the registration 
agreement and the commencement of suit; during which 
time, however, the contacts above referred to with 
brokers, the SEC, April and Aprilfs attorney were made. 
April states that the fact that the plaintiffs 
awaited the outcome of Lowe's suit indicates that they 
did not care about their registration rights (p.8). 
To the contrary, it shows that when Lowe's case was 
decided, they then had some assurance that April's 
assertion that the directors' registration rights were 
void would not be sustained in court. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO WAIVER 
This court said in Phoenix Insurance Company vs. Heath, 
90 U 187, 61 P2d 308,311, cited in our original brief: 
We cannot find ... any waiver of plaintiff's 
rights as found by the trial court. A 
waiver is the intentional relinquishment 
of a known right, 27 R.CL. 904. To consti-
tute a waiver, there must be an existing 
right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge 
of its existence, and an intention to re-
linquish it. It must be distinctly made, 
although it may be express or implied." 
(emphasis added) 
The court there could find no waiver and reversed, as 
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the court should do here. 
The trial court here concluded that plaintiffs were 
aware "or should have been aware of the scope and effect 
of their agreement," and that plaintiffs ,fwere aware or 
are charged with an awareness of their legal rights under 
the agreement and they effectively waived those rights" 
(R. 154). These conclusions of law were in the alter-
native, showing that the trial court concluded that it 
was plaintiffs' duty to be aware of their rights and 
that there could be a waiver of rights of which they 
should have been aware, but were not. This is at odds 
with the rule as set forth in Phoenix. 
The trial court's decision is hinged upon the pre-
mise that plaintiffs had the affirmative duty to actively 
assert their rights by making demandfor registration 
prior to the commencement of suit. 
Theiequitable part of plaintiffs' claim, wherein 
it is asserted that they are presently entitled to freely 
tradeable shares, has been decided in plaintiffs' favor. 
There is no cross appeal and, therefore, no issue thereon. 
The legal portion of plaintiffs' claim, wherein they are 
See also Mitchell vs. Alfred Hofmann, Inc., 48 N.J. 
Superior 396, 137 A.2d 569,573, wherein the requirements 
for waiver were expressed as being a "voluntary relin-
quishment of a known right evidenced by a clear, unequi-
vocal and decisive act showing an intent to relinquish." 
-5-
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claiming damages for failure of April to register is now 
before this court. This court, therefore, is not dealing 
with equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel, but only 
the legal doctrine of waiver. 
The evidence is insufficient for the trial court to 
have determined that there was waiver. The trial court 
ignored the evidence before it of desire to sell. Mrs. 
Wilcox and Herman Bjork were in touch with April, trying 
3 
to sell their shares. The fact that there is no evidence 
that either Harold Bjork or Anderson contacted April would, 
at most, constitute silence or inaction on their part. 
The case of Voelker vs. Joseph, 62 Wash.2d 429, 383 P2d 
301, 305, is a case involving inaction by a party and non-
assertion of his rights. The language of the Washington 
court is applicable tc this case. The court in discussing 
implied waiver by silence said: 
ffThere is, however, substantial merit in one con-
tention of the appellant, and this requires the 
granting of a new trial. The trial court instructed 
the jury that a right may be waived impliedly by a 
party who neglects to insist upon it. The evidence 
was that the appellant did not make an immediate 
claim that the offsets which the respondents' 
customers demanded should not be deducted from the 
payments made to him by the respondents, and in 
fact indicated that he was not surprised that 
damaged apples had appeared, although he did not 
admit the responsibility for the defects. The 
six-year statute of limitations applied to his 
cause of action, and he did not file suit until 
nearly five of these years had elapsed. While 
the respondents state that they were prejudiced 
by this inaction, they do not state wherein the 
See plaintiffs1 original brief pages 8 - 13. 
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the prejudice lay. No doubt, they were incon-
venienced, but this type of inconvenience attends 
the delay of any suit within the statutory period 
of limitations. The legislature has decreed 
what shall be reasonable time within which to 
bring suit, and it cannot be said that the mere 
failure to bring suit constitutes a waiver of 
the right of action, so long as suit is brought 
within the statutory period . . . 
Insofar as our research has disclosed, the 
courts invoke the doctrine of implied waiver 
by silence or acquiescence only where a forfeit-
ure would otherwise result. There is no question 
of forfeiture before us here. 
In this case, there was no showing that the 
appellant had knowledge of all of the facts at 
the time the deductions were made from payments 
on his account or that the circumstances existing 
at that time required him to protest; no showing 
the he expressly waived the right to payment of 
the balance; and no showing that the respondents 
were prejudiced by his failure to assert this 
right.f! 
As said in 92 CJS, Waiver 1064: 
"A waiver may arise or be implied from the 
acquiescence or silence of the party who has 
the power of waiving, under circumstances which 
require him to speak, but silence to constitute 
a waiver, must be deceptive silence, and it 
must be accompanied by an intention to defraud 
which amounts to a positive beguilement. Mere 
silence is never a waiver, when there is no duty 
or occasion to speak; and where such silence is 
unaccompanied by any act calculated to mislead, 
and in the absence of conduct amounting to an 
estoppel, there is no waiver." (emphasis added) 
See also 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver, par. 160. 
There was no evidence that April was prejudiced by 
any inaction of any plaintiff, nor that there was fraud, 
beguilement nor deception. In fact, insofar as deception 
is concerned, April stated that had it been "aware" of 
-7-
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the rights of plaintiffs "the company would have asserted 
the invalidity of both the issuance of the stock and the 
issuance of the registration rights" (R.109), as it in 
fact did. 
April argues that the restrictive legend on the shares 
provided that they could not be sold without a registration 
statement or opinion of counsel, satisfactory to the issuer, 
that registration was not required; and concludes that, had 
plaintiffs wanted to sell, they should have sought advice 
from an attorney (p.12). The response to this varies some-
what for each of the plaintiffs. Some sought the counsel 
and opinion of persons familiar with stock transactions, 
their brokers. "Counsel" in its broader sense is not 
limited to attorneys. Mrs. Wilcox's broker consulted April's 
attorney (R.301,309), who should have been "counsel sat-
isfactory to the issuer." However, all plaintiffs would 
have been unsuccessful in having April agree that the shares 
were tradeable, regardless of any attorney's opinion which 
any plaintiff might have furnished because April contended 
that the shares were void.(R.109). 
"The law does not require the doing of a vain or 
useless act, nor does the failure to do such act 
constitute a waiver of legal rights, or defeat a 
right otherwise conditioned on such act." Title 
and Trust Company vs. Durkheimer, 155 Ore. 427, 
63 P2d 909,91$. 
April contends that the court was justified in thinking 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that Mrs. Wilcox followed Parker's suggestion to hang on 
to the stock foV it would be "worth a lot of money'1 
(p.12). April is doing just what the trial court did 
in taking evidence out of context, because, as shown in 
our original brief, after that advice was given to Mrs. 
Wilcox, she made many attempts to have the shares made 
4 
tradeable and to sell. 
April asserts that there is no showing that it knew 
about the "claimed right of any of these particular 
plaintiffs" (p.13). Such a contention is inconceivable. 
Plaintiffs and Lowe were the only officers of the pre- r 
decessor company. Parker's lawyer suggested that there 
be a piggy-back registration. Parker became president 
and director and the lawyer became counsel for the company 
and a director. Furthermore, Lowe's letter to April 
(Ex.l3P) which the court refused to admit in one instance, 
but which, nevertheless was admitted in a deposition which 
was made a part of the record stated: 
"I notice that there is no attempt made to 
register the restricted shares that I have 
and other officers of the original company 
and my partner, Andrew R. Hurley, have, which 
by the agreement, a copy of which I sent in 
my letter of August 6th, were to be registered." 
The company couldn't have been blissfully ignorant 
of its obligation to plaintiffs. 
See also Plaintiffs' original brief page 9. 
See also Plaintiffs' original brief page 4. 
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April then contends that it could reasonably have be-
lieved that plaintiffs did not wish to have their shares in-
cluded in the public offering (p.13). April was hardly 
misled in light of the above quoted letter. 
April attempts to distinguish between this case and 
the Lowe case by saying first that Lowe demanded that April 
include his and Hurley's shares in the registration state-
ment (p.13, note 4). The demand in the Lowe case was the 
identical demand which was made in this case, i.e. Lowe's 
letter quoted above, referring to the failure to include 
restricted shares of all plaintiffs. The other attempted 
distinction is that April claims that the Lowe case is 
replete with contacts he made with April concerning ways 
to settle the controversy (p.13, note 9). There is no 
rule of law requiring a claimant to negotiate for settle-
ment of any breach of an agreement. 
April asserts that plaintiffs had reasons for not sell-
ing, contending that, since the stock rose from the public 
offering price of $13 to a later price of $14 before drop-
ping to 75 cents, that the court could have inferred that 
plaintiffs did not wish to sell at $13 (p.13). It does 
not take such an application of hindsight to illustrate 
that stock prices go up and down. Of course, the quotes 
would fluctuate. The efforts of plaintiffs to get freely 
-10-
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tradeable shares and to sell their restricted shares and 
the sale by them of their tradeable shares negate the 
argument that plaintiffs did not wish to sell. 
April argues that the court could have found that 
plaintiffs had abandoned their rights to registration 
(p.14). The court did not find abandonment, but based 
its ruling upon the related doctrine of waiver. The 
authorities cited by April in support of the concept of 
abandonment are distinguishable. They all involve 
affirmative inconsistent acts by the plaintiff who thereby 
abandons his right to enforce the contract. None involves 
mere delay in asserting rights, which is the most that 
April claims here. ' ' ' . ' 
Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. vs. Harper, U , 
P2d~ j Case No. 13936 filed December 3, 1975. 
In Pitcher vs. Lauritzen, 18 U2d 368, 423 P2d 491 " 
(1967), the parties had entered into an earnest money re-
ceipt for the sale of realty, which provided that on or 
before a given date a contract of sale would be drawn up, 
which was never done. This constituted abandonment. No 
such situation exists here. In King vs. Firm, 3 U2d 419, 
285 P2d 1114 (1955), there were two sets of notes and 
mortgages. The plaintiff released the earlier set, with 
a recitation in the release referring to the later set as 
being "unused papers," indicating the parties had never 
used the later set, nor intended that they be effective. 
He was held to have abandoned his right's in the later set. 
No such situation exists here. 
The language April quotes from the superseded 12 Am. 
Jur., Contracts, par. 442, is taken from a section entitled 
"Repudiation of Contract as Grounds for Rescission." It 
involves the determination that if a party wrongfully re-
pudiates a contract that the other party is then entitled 
to rescind. Such is not involved here. Ours is a unilateral 
contract. Plaintiffs had already performed and were under 
no further duty of performance and therefore could not 
-11-
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April contends that plaintiffs had essentially an 
f,optionM to have their shares included in a public offering 
(p.15). This is a deliberate misconstruction of the language 
of the agreement sued upon, which provides that the com-
pany... 
"Agrees with stockholders that if the company 
files a registration statement in the future 
for the transfer of shares other than those 
represented by the certificate issued to the 
above named stockholders, the company will 
include these shares in such registration x 
statement" (Ex.2D). 
There is no option involved. It is a firm obligation, not 
dependent upon any election to be exercised on the part of 
plaintiffs. 
wrongfully repudiate. 
The corresponding section in the second edition of 
American Jurisprudence is 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, par. 505, 
in which it is even more clearly pointed out that what is 
being discussed is wrongful repudiation and refusal to per-
form. The quoted section now reads: 
"Repudiation or renunciation. As a general rule, 
the rescission of a contract by one party thereto 
is permitted for the other party's repudiation of 
the contract or any essential part of it. Thus, 
it is well settled that a party may so wrongfully 
repudiate the contract as to authorize the other 
to renounce and rescind it, as where the conduct 
of one of the parties evinces an intention no longer 
to be bound by the contract." (emphasis added) 
Plaintiffs here did not renounce and did not wrong-
fully repudiate any obligation. 
The cases cited by American Jurisprudence show that 
its quoted language refers to a situation in which there 
is a bilateral rather than unilateral contract. The "in-
consistent" conduct referred to is the conduct of a wrong-
fully repudiating party, who then seeks to enforce the con-
tract after the other party has acquiesced in the repudiation. 
That did not occur here. 
-12-
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April states that the trial court found that plain-
tiffs decided not to exercise their "option11 (p. 15). 
The trial court found no such thing. To the contrary, 
it expressly faund that there was the above quoted 
.:-.. "agreement11 (R.151). 
April argues that it would be bad public policy to 
permit plaintiffs to sue at any time within the six-year 
statute of limitations period for a breach of contract 
(p.15). If April had recognized the validity of the 
-A stock, and had there been alternative ways of making 
the shares saleable, of which plaintiffs should reasonably 
have been aware, then the principal of "cover,ff which 
April so strenuously asserts would indeed have been app-
~ licable. Plaintiffs would then have been limited in the 
amount of their recovery by the price at which they could 
have sold within a reasonable time after the breach, as 
set forth in the citations of April (p.16). That, how-
ever, would not, as contended by April (p.16), bar the 
action, which could be brought at any time during the six-
year limitation period. If it is bad public policy to 
permit the bringing of a suit for breach of a written con-
tract within a six-year period, the legislature, not this 
court, should shorten the limitation period. 
The cases cited by April on mitigation of damages 
are distinguishable: In Galigher vs. Jones, 179 U.S. 
-13-
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193, 9 S.Ct. 335, 32 L.Ed 658 (1889) there was conversion 
of stock which the court required the plaintiff to replace 
within a reasonable time, awarding damages based on the 
price of the stock within said reasonable time period. In 
Clements vs. Mueller, 41 F2d 41 (9th Circ. 1930) damages 
were claimed for refusal of defendant to sell its stock to 
plaintiff. Plaintiff could have covered by buying other 
stock within said reasonable time and damages were based 
upon prices within said reasonable time period. Reynolds 
vs. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, 309 F.Supp. 548 (D.Utah 
1970) involved a false news release which minimized the 
importance of a publicized ore strike, relying on which 
the plaintiffs sold. Plaintiff could have repurchased 
other shares within a reasonable time and damages were 
based on prices within said reasonable time period. The 
distinction is that, in those cases the plaintiffs had 
the ability to mitigate, whereas in the instant case, 
plaintiffs, wanting to sell, had no means to do so because 
April would not recognize the validity of their stock. 
April says that it: 
"Presented considerable evidence of how plaintiffs 
might have minimized their damages through the use 
of either an opinion letter or of Rule 144M (p.16). 
April completely ignores, and makes no attempt to rebut, 
the showing in our original brief that both an opinion letter 
and Rule 144 were and are unavailable to plaintiffs so long 
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as April asserts that plaintiffs1 stock is void. 
•
:3 — POINT I I I . 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
April argues that it was not error to refuse to ad-
mit into evidence Exhibit 13P (p.17). It characterizes 
the letter as one demanding that April include the shares 
of Lowe and Hurley in a public offering, again ignoring 
the fact that the letter referred to shares of "other 
officers of the original company'1 (Ex.l3P). April con-
tends that "there is nothing in the language of the letter 
to indicate that it was written on behalf of any of the 
plaintiffs" (p.18). The language of Ex.l3P, referring 
to stock owned by the "other officers>" shows that is 
just not so. April's contention that none of the plain-
tiffs knew of the existence of the letter and that they 
had not authorized nor approved thereof (p.18), is only 
true as of the date the letter was written. They offered 
to prove their subsequent knowledge of it and their appro-
val thereof (R.210-215,237,266,289), which offer was re-
jected. 
April argues that the letter should not have been 
admitted because there was "no proof offered that Mr. 
See also Plaintiffs1 original brief pages 26 
and 32. 
1 r 
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Lowe was acting on behalf of the plaintiffs at the time he 
wrote the letter" (p.18). The letter speaks for itself, 
that he was purporting to act on their behalf. 
April contends that there was no evidence that "plain-
tiffs understood the letter to be sent on their behalf" 
(p.18). They cite the Restatement of Agency, Second 82. 
The Restatement does not require evidence of the principal's 
"understanding." The letter was expressly written on 
plaintiffs' behalf. The letter is clear and was obviously 
intended to remind April that plaintiffs' shares should be 
registered. Since the court did not permit plaintiffs' 
testimony as to ratification to be introduced, it erroneously 
ignored the effect of ratification. 
There is no "implausible" theory of agency, as contended 
by April (p.19), but a logical feeling on the part of plain-
tiffs, that if a reminder had already been given to April on 
their behalf prior to the issuance of the final prospectus, 
there would be nothing gained by further complaints to April, 
after it had breached the agreement by refusing to register. 
Plaintiffs tendered their shares into court for delivery 
to April and proffered to treat April's conduct as a conver-
sion, thereby giving up their shares. The court sustained 
April's objection thereto (R.381). This left plaintiffs 
in possession of their unsaleable shares. April argues that 
the fact that plaintiffs still have their restricted shares 
-16-
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puts them in an unconscionable position. True, as April 
points out, the shares may go up, but they may also go 
down further. April is only showing one side of the coin 
in saying if the stock goes up, plaintiffs will be subse-
quently benefited. If it goes down before they can sell, 
they will have lost more than the amount prayed for in 
this action, because there has to be some cut-off point 
for ascertaining damages for breach of the agreement to 
register. We fail to see how April can say that plain-
tiffs were "unwilling" to give up their stock when they 
tendered It into court and defendant refused to take it. 
Nor, can we see how April can logically argue that such 
"unwillingness" was "the reason the trial court judge 
felt that they had waived their rights" (p.20). 
April objects that plaintiffs "wanted to keep the 
stock and obtain damages" for failure to include the shares 
in the offering (p.19). Such a position is not unusual. 
Had the agreement here been one for sale of the stock, in 
an action for damages for.breach thereof, plaintiffs would 
keep their shares while suing for damages. The shares 
might go up or down. In that case, damages would be 
determined by the difference between the agreed price and 
the price for which the seller would have resold within 
a reasonable time after the breach, thus limiting the 
time within which market flucuation might add to.or dimin-
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ish the amount of damages. Here, where the agreement in-
volved is to make the shares saleable, April's breach (which 
prevents plaintiffs from having marketable shares) prevents 
the application of a "reasonable time period" in which to 
dispose of the shares, thereby lengthening the time until 
the date of trial in which market fluctuation might increase 
or decrease damages. 
April argues that it is not presently refusing to re-
cognize plaintiffs' position as shareholders, despite its 
rejection of plaintiffs' second tender of shares to accom-
plish the exchange for tradeable shares as ordered in the 
decree. April's response to this second tender was to the 
effect that it won't recognize plaintiffs' shares because 
plaintiffs have appealed (R.123-124). Plaintiffs have not 
appealed from the only favorable part of the lower court's 
judgment; that they are entitled to freely tradeable shares. 
On the other hand, April in its brief, could have cross 
appealed, asserting that the court erred in ruling that the 
shares were valid and that plaintiffs were entitled to trade-
able shares. April states that: 
"Though it has reservations about the propriety 
of the order requiring it to issue the shares 
without restrictive legends, defendant will com-
ply with that order as soon as all appeal periods 
have expired." (p.2). 
Even now that it has not cross appealed, and there is, 
therefore, no issue as to whether or not the court's order 
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that the shares be recognized is binding, April is con-
tending that plaintiffs should not presently have trade-
able shares and that they must await the decision on 
this appealj which decision will have nothing to do 
with the validity of the order to make the shares trade-
able. In other words, April is still refusing to recog-
nize that plaintiffs are entitled to valid, tradeable 
shares. 
April states that if plaintiffs presently sold their 
shares, plaintiffs would probably be violating "applicable 
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 through improper 
public sale of restricted stock" (p.20, note 11), thus re-
cognizing that even now plaintiffs can't sell. 
This court held in the Lowe case that if April were 
going to rescind because of alleged fraud, etc., it had 
to act promptly. April, in its conclusion, argues that 
plaintiffs here are in a similar position to that of 
April, there (p.21). It is an equitable rule which re-
quires prompt election to rescind or affirm upon discovery 
of fraud, as held in Perry vs. Woodall, 20 U2d 309, 438 
P2d 813. Such rule of equity is inapplicable in an action 
at law for damages for breach of contract. 
CONCLUSION 
One of Aprilfs few valid contentions is that plain-
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tiffs did not, after the agreement to register was breached 
and before suit, complain to April nor attempt to negotiate 
a compromise solution. But no such duties to complain or 
negotiate are imposed upon one claiming damages for breach 
of contract. Plaintiffs must bring an action within the 
period of the statute of limitation, which period should 
not be shortened by an argument that public policy will 
best be served by requiring them to act sooner. 
Lowe had asked for performance of the obligation to 
register plaintiffs' shares. Lowe, in his suit, had been 
met with the defense that directors1 shares were void. ^ 
Plaintiffs knew that. If Lowe's shares were void, plain-
tiffs' shares were void. Consultations by two of the 
plaintiffs with April as to how to sell the shares accomplished 
nothing. Awaiting the outcome of Lowe's suit as to validity 
of the shares and of the agreement to register, and deciding 
to sue when April's contention of invalidity was rejected 
by the court, was reasonable action on plaintiffs' part. 
There was no indication that plaintiffs knowingly and 
intentionally waived any right, and even less, was there 
clear and convincing evidence thereof. Plaintiffs, although 
in like positions in that they each had restricted shares, 
were not acting in concert. The attempts to sell were through 
their separate brokers, each plaintiff using his own. Con-
tacts with the SEC, with April's officers, and with April's 
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attorney were separate and different. Waiver cannot be 
based on negligence, inattention, or inadvertence. There 
is no evidence that any one of the plaintiffs knowingly 
and intentionally relinquished his rights, much less 
that each one of them did. It is unlikely that anyone 
would want to give up the valuable right to get market-
able shares. It is highly unlikely that four persons, 
acting independently, with different contacts, would each 
come to a decision that he wanted to waive his valuable 
rights. The evidence is to the contrary, that each 
wanted to sell. 
The court should remand, with instructions, to award 
damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John W. Lowe 
Brayton, Lowe § Hurley 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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